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Theories Behind Language Acquisition Theories
David Sell
Passive and dynamic views of language learning
Since language is species-specific, clearly there is something innate in
every human being which makes it possible to learn a language. Just
what that is the object of considerable debate between rationalist- and
i)
empiricist-oriented linguistics. A distinction has been made between a
2)
"content child" and a "process child," the former referring to the ratio-
nalist view that a child is born with advance knowledge of an elaborate
set of all linguistic universals and the means to determine (learn) the
language he is exposed to; and the latter representing an empiricist view
(where no great discrepancy is seen between language experienced and
language learned) which minimizes the extent of innateness to a certain
ability or propensity to acquire a language through extensive exposure to
3)
it.
Langacker sees this issue as a choice between positing no linguistic
structure as innate or positing almost all of language as innately specified.
Derwing cites this view and a number of others, denying that there is
such a dichotomy, because of the "limitless number of logically possible
This paper is part of a wider discussion, "Units and Rules in Language and
Linguistics," a search for some resolution of the debate between transformational-
generative grammar (TGG), philosophically rationalistic and psychologically
cognitive, and the more empirical and behavioristic linguistic thought: the
empirical theory of language (ETL) , stemming from "structural" linguistics.
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gradations between" and later concludes again that there are "numerous
logical alternatives to Chomsky's content hypothesis of innateness which
5)
might explain the species-specific character of language..." What is
suggested below is that in fact there is a very basic flaw commonto many
of these alternatives. To do so, it will suffice to consider the two most
polarized points of view; the others fall between these.
Empiricism sees little or no difficulty in accomodating reality (for the
linguist, language as it is used) with knowledge of it (competence, in
linguistics), since this school, as a general tendency, equates knowledge
with experience. Thus, linguists of this denomination minimize the
discrepancy between "primary data" and language as acquired. In more
extreme cases, empiricists rule out the very possibility of a difference
between what a person is exposed to and what he learns.
In studies of the mind today, empiricism is strongly influenced by the
philosophy of materialism, according to which an explanation of learning
in man must be viable for some highly complex machine. Given this
mechanized view of man as an apparatus of clearly observable discrete
material parts, a "black box" approach to solving the problem of knowl-
7)
edge and language acquisition is envisioned. And it is in this framework
that the present debate is formulated: for Chomsky the box contains
linguistic universals; for empiricists, the minimum necessary for coming
to perform properly in a language.
The rationalists' view is explained, of course, by the great discrepancy
they see between phenomena (primary data, for the linguist) and ideas
(competence acquired). Thus, Chomsky concludes that the tabula rasa
thesis is not viable, and that knowledge of grammatical structure cannot
be explained by inductive operations "developed within linguistics, psy-
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chology, or philosophy." Chomsky is presumably referring to positivistic
formulations of linguistics, psychology and philosophy which construct
models of acquisition of a passive (mechanical, impersonal) nature as
explanations of an active (personal) knower. It is true that a more
convincing formulation is needed, but, unfortunately, Chomsky does not
rise above the man the machine bias of his age. His only recourse, then,
is to assume that what the complex machine cannot accomplish towards
knowledge (and language) acquisition must be present in the machine to
begin with. Within a mechanized view of man, Chomsky's conclusion is
logical. Therefore, if the conclusion is unacceptable, the only recourse is
to seek a new point of view.
Let us recall first that the quest for simplest statement, in linguistics
in general and in TGG in particular, has led to extremely abstract descrip-
tions of language. Ironically, when such a description is assigned to an
individual person, the result is an apparatus far more complicated than
what introspection comes close to bearing out. Thus, Chomsky is im-
pressed with what he construes to be a chasm separating knowledge acquired
and data observed. But, for his position to be verified, it is necessary
to show that what the learner acquires are the units and rules required
by a machine-the most economically programmed machine, in fact. And
since ETL works in basically the same materialistic framework, the debate
between these two schools revolves around an unreal issue: how can
a person learn a language description designed for a computer?
The position adopted in TGG that experience and knowledge are to be
distinguished-that knowledge is not merely a direct copy of perceptions-
is well taken, given the active and creative interpretation of reality evident
in knowledge acquisition. But this distinction is carried to an extreme
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when perceptions are reduced to a mere trigger for activating innate
knowledge. In a footnote to his discussion on how a child processes
primary linguistic data, Katz says that "the role of experience is primarily
to provide the data against which predictions and thus hypotheses are
judged. Experience serves not to provide the things to be copied by the
mind, as in the empiricist's account, but to help eliminate false hypotheses
9)
about the rules of a language." It is quite revealing that he refers to
the psychological role of experience in knowledge acquisition without
mentioning its role as a representation of external realities.
Intuitively, one is prompted to say, against this rationalism, that knowl-
edge can only mean knowledge of reality, not knowledge of ideas (innate
or otherwise), which would be redundant. A tree, after all, is not just
the experience we derive from it, nor merely our knowledge of it; it is
a tree even if not known. It may be grouped in other languages with
things not called trees in English, but this does not alter its objective status
as a thing unto itself. And against extreme empiricism, it would appear
that human knowledge of a thing is of two types: perceptual (taking
in individual-specific aspects of that singular thing) and intellectual (an
awareness that the thing has an essential unity equivalent to other similar
things, beyond a mere conglomeration of perceptions of it.
That being the general difference between these two schools, we can
now look at a weakness they share: their reduction of learning entirely
to external factors, much as a computer is programmed from the outside.
The only difference between them is a trivial one: that the rationalist's
computer is more sophisticated. For the empiricist, the action of the
external world on the senses is the cause of knowledge. And for the
rationalist, part of the cause is relegated to heredity; and this innateness
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is so extensive as to fill the experience-to-knowledge gap completely.
10)
Nowthis truely impoverishes the capacity of man to know, for it assigns
learning to factors already there, leaving no room for a creative, intellectual
id
interpretation of experience. This alone contradicts something which
is intuitively obvious, even if pending rigorous formulation: that each
individual has considerable leeway of thought in coming up with personal
explanations of the same reality we all see (thus we have debates in
linguistics, for example).
In this issue, as in many issues in linguistics, it would be safer to
adopt as a point of departure apparent facts which are rather certain-
those which are instinctively correct and enjoy conventional agreement-
and work from there to a theoretical statement. By way of example, a
basic weakness of TGG in particular is to begin with the assumption that
the simplest theory is the truest and to stay with this even when conclu-
sions seem to contradict the data of introspection. A valid contradiction
of common sense must be accompanied by an explanation of why the
supposed error was generally accepted as true (as, for example, in the
case of the apparent flatness of the earth). Both TGG and ETL fail here
in this sense: neither offers an account of why we feel that our thinking
is not entirely determined by external (non-personal) factors; in effect,
they seem to consider such a feeling an illusion.
This view of knowledge and language acquisition as passive, noncrea-
12)
tive and mechanical is evident in many authors. Householder speaks of
"(a) an automatic generalizer, a tendency to assume that even a single
instance allows the formulation of a general rule and to formulate some
such rule however insufficient the data, along with (b) a similarity-seeking
drive, which forces, at every new experience, an exhaustive memory search
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for all previous experiences which could be said to resemble it in any
13)
way." The use of terms like "automatic," "tendency," and a "drive"
which "forces" certain reactions to sensations-especially if projected to
adult learning-certainly carries the implication that there is nothing
creative about knowledge acquisition.
There are statements which carry this mechanization to its logical
extreme: the denial of freedom. Anastasi maintains that "every trait of
the individual and every reaction that he manifests depend both upon his
heredity and upon his environment." No other factors are considered.
The individual is a victim of circumstances, and no freedom is acknowl-
edged at all. The fact that we are intuitively aware of this freedom
means that it is not to be swept under the carpet for being difficult to
account for, or brushed aside as an unscientific illusion. It must be
accepted or disproved. And neither the rationalism nor the empiricism
behind current linguistics (nor, therefore, any of the shades between)
will be able to account for the freedom of mental activity.
Compare this deterministic view of the human mind with that of
Jolivet, who considers thought as "essentially dynamic," because "it implies
a constant movement" between ideas, relating them in new ways. "It is
this very movement, this internal tension which amounts to (1) "mainta-
ining a unity which analysis or division continually work to destroy and
(2) discovering in confused unity...the interminable diversity which is
its richness. Thinking is therefore, in a sense, creating..." He adds:
"the mind does not truely understand what it does not in some way
15)
engender itself."
It will be interesting to go on to consider, in summarized form, re-
16)
marks by Jolivet regarding materialism in psychological studies which seem
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to apply directly to the framework in which the TGG/ETL debate on
learning takes place. Jolivet ranks materialistic theories in psychology as
an opposite extreme from those of Descartes and others who reduce this
science to the area of the consciousness. Materialism equates the psychic
and the physical, which are seen to differ only in the waythey are known.
Bergson finds this position untenable. He points out that, according to this
hypothesis, mental representations of the world "would be a product of
the brain, which is nothing more than a part of the world. Thus, a part
of our representation would be the cause of the whole representation, i. e.
one part of the world would produce the whole world, which is absurd."
Jolivet himself objects that materialism is not so much a psychology as it
is a philosophy, and has against it, in any case, that what are intuited as
really distinct (physical and psychological realities) , and which cannot be
known through the same means, are equated by definition.
Materialistic psychology finds a kind of extreme in the behaviorism of
Watson, who maintained that psychism is not able to go beyond the myth
of the soul; internal life and consciousness cannot be objects of science
properly speaking; introspection is confusion and full of vagueness. But
Jolivet points out that a psychology which denies the consciousness would
be a science without an object. Studies of stimulus and response must
lead to a knowledge of the individual himself, who intervenes between
stimulus and response. To ensure for psychology completeness and exact-
ness, a study of observable organic and physiological conditions will
provide an empirical approach to underlying realities. But there is no
real motivation (apart from philosophical bias) for determining a priori
to interpret S-R phenomena in a purely organic and physiological sense
(which would leave psychology indistinguishable from physiology). Mc-
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18)
Dougall has shown that even the instinctive activity of an animal requires
explanation in psychic terms. Thorndike makes a similar point. All the
more in the case of man. Lalande wonders how a term like Pavlov's
"reflex" can be applied to cognitive, aesthetic, and volitional activities.
"The idea of reflex," Jolivet comments, "implies something mechanical,
regular, and impersonal, which is the least suited to higher forms of
psychological life."
The expression "neuropsychic" phenomena, used in materialistic be-
haviorism, already exposes an error of this doctrine. "If psychic facts
are reducible to nervous conditions, what need is there to speak of
neuTopsychism?" Betcherew explains that this is in order to distinguish
neuropsychic reactions (cries of pain, etc.) from purely somatic reactions
(inflamation of the tissues, etc.). "But from the behaviorist point of view,
this distinction is entirely arbitrary" and circular: psychism is defined
by reflexes, "and here reflexes are distinguished according to the presence
or aosence of psychism/ In addition, the behaviorist definition suffers
from the defect of excluding from psychology all intellectual and affective
phenomena not evident in specific behaviors."
This, then, is the psychology, or even philosophy, within which two
schools of linguistics seem to find themselves and within which they
debate. Can we expect much in the way of enlightenment even if they
come to terms? Will this not just bring into linguistics other counter-
intuitive conclusions arising from materialistic over-axiomization?
Bases for an alternatire
Historically, the rationalist/empiricist debate finds its origin in no less
than the so-called problem of the universals, which, briefly, comes down
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to the following paradox: an idea, which is an abstract sign of reality,
does not seem to correspond, to anything real, since everything real is
19)
individual. Although this question appears far removed from anything
linguistically interesting, its solution (i. e. the personal philosophy of the
linguist) can be expected to influence very directly one's conception of
how linguistic data relate to acquisition of competence.
On the basis of Jolivet's treatment of the subject, it will be useful to
recall the main lines along which empiricism and idealism view this
20)
problem of ideas. He groups both these schools under "nominalism" and
sees in them the common trait of denying the ontological accessibility of
abstract notions. Empiricism tends to equate idea and image; idealism
admits of universals (ideas), but not as accounted for by experience.
(Here, already, the parallel with the ETL/TGG debate on language acqui-
sition is apparent.) In his choice of philosophy (a basis for his study of
psychology) Jolivet chooses the Aristotelian version of inductive abstraction,
21)
which he feels combines the advantages of both empiricism and idealism.
Together with empiricism, it preserves the idea as real or objective, though
distinguishing it from an image. On the other hand, abstractionism agrees
with idealism on the atomistic, discontinuous, and inconsistent nature of
the universe, lacking the unity proper of an idea. But the error of
idealism is seen to be "making the idea something extraneous to sensible
reality." Thus, expificism and idealism agree that the choice is between
sensible reality or the idea. The idealist maintains that if the idea is
Peal, it is not rational; the empiricist says if the idea is rational, it is
not real. Aristotle takes the stand, rather, that the idea is both real (its
origin lies in experience) and rational (it expresses an abstraction not
found as such in external reality).
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It would be reasonable, then, to avoid both the idealist or the empiri-
cist philosophies since both have overaxiomized their original assumptions,
and, in either case, the linguist runs the danger of a biased conception of
language acquisition prior to a study of it, while carrying into linguistics
pitfalls parallel to those found in these two philisophies. Aristotelian
abstractionism promises a more flexible framework: just as this school
appears to satisfy the more reasonable demands of both idealism and
empiricism, we can hope that it will provide a certain leeway to enable
resolving issues in linguistics on which rationalists and empiricists seem
hopelessly divided. This hope is fostered by the nature of Aristotelian
philosophy, which is a school of thought capable of providing a philoso-
phical basis for empirical study. Jolivet feels that the respect for the
reality and the autonomy of experimental psychology, for example, finds
its roots in the psychology of Aristotle, who held that, to arrive at a
definition of the nature of the soul, one must begin with a study of
psychological phenomena. Binet wrote, in fact, that the only philosophy
which possesses the elements necessary as a basis and justification of an
22)
experimental psychology is this one. If this is the case, then the advan-
tages of Aristotelianism carry over into linguistics, a branch of cognitive
p sych ology.
But, for the linguist, of more immediate interest than a choice of
philosophy is the choice of psychology. We can note, then, the gist of
Jolivet's remarks regarding the psychology eleborated within the framework
23)
å of Aristotelian philosophy. According to Aristotle, the psychism is denned
by the concept of life and presumes only to designate the reality of some
vital principle such as vegetal, sensitive, or rational. In this way the
original assumptions are minimized. And in practice it is the current
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usage "to reserve the term psychic to refer to everything which concerns
in any way [cognitive and affective life"-a reasonably "objective and
precise definition of the object proper of psychology." This definition
implies no philosophical bias and does not prejudice further statements
about the nature of the psychism. It merely sets down that, empirically,
all cognitive and affective phenomena pertain to the psychism. At the
same time, this implies that psychology must take into consideration those
biological and physiological phenomena which are united to cognitive and
affective activity.
Within such a framework, psychology accomodates many points of view
being debated and takes in the conscious, the unconscious, physiological
phenomena, behavior, analogies with animal psychology, and even social
influences. This synthetic starting point is "a sign and guarantee of
objectivity."
To accomodate the advantages of both idealism and empiricism in a
psychological framework, Jolivet sets up a framework of more immediate
interest than philosophies like materialism, spiritualism, empiricism, ratio-
24)
nalism, etc. Such hypotheses he sees as too far removed from psychology
to be directly borne out or negated by psychological facts. He makes
reference to a psychological dualism in setting up a hypothesis for his
study: Data available call for an underlying dynamism for explanation.
Psychological activity is always united to and directed by facts of con-
sciousness-facts of a specific or concrete nature and those of an intellectual
or abstract nature. From this cognitive duality he sees "a sensible activity
over sensible reality and an intellectual activity over immaterial and ab-
stract objects." This much is considered the area of facts requiring ex-
planation, and for this he sets up his dual-principle hypothesis: "the whole
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of psychological life is directed by two distinct principles, one of which,
referred to sensible reality, is oriented and directed by the other principle,
which is referred to the abstract and immaterial aspect of things."
This thesis is developed (against rationalism) by pointing out that
knowledge of specific physical realities (through images in the brain) is
not entirely separable from knowledge of abstract realities. This is seen,
25)
first of all, in the origin of ideas, all of which ultimately arise from images
(the essential features of which are arrived at by inductive abstraction)-
following Aristotle's view that "there is nothing in the mind which was
not first in the senses." Secondly, and again in Aristotle's words, "one
does not think without images"-a natural consequence of the first con-
sideration. Actually, a concept (e. g. 'rabbit') is generally accompanied
by a number of images (of rabbits) of a confused or random nature.
And, contrary to materialistic empiricism, thought cannot be reduced to
images; thoughts "immensely surpass" imagination.
Experiments have been carried out which seem to uphold the notion of
two realms of knowledge which, though distinct, are intimately related, one
subordinated to the other. Experiments by Ribot concerned the following
problem: "When one thinks of, hears, or reads a general (abstract) term,
what in the consciousness accompanies this sign immediately and without
reflection?" The procedure was to pronounce words of varying abstractions
(e.g. 'dog,' 'cause') and immediately ask a subject if they called up
something in his "spirit." Each of the 103 subjects cited the word itself
and some sort of image. Results showed that "in many cases the image is
very different from the meaning of the word," and the subjects indicated
"the meaning of the word as perceived in their consciousness as distinct and
independent of the image."
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Experiments by Messer and Buhler were aimed at "determining if it is
possible to think without images," i. e. whether thought is possible without
any images at all, or whether accompanying images are insufficient to
characterize thought completely. In one of his experiments, Messer cued
his subjects with tri-syllable nouns, eliciting a subordinated concept falling
within the extension of the cue. In each case the subject was immedi-
ately asked to describe the psychological process which entered into his
response. Buhler carried out an experiment involving yes/no questions
of a an abstract nature ("Is monism a negation of personality?" "Can you
calculate the velocity of a freely falling body?" etc.). After answering
with a simple yes or no, the subject was to describe immediately "what
had occurred in his consciousness." The conclusions reached after these
experiments can be summed up as follows: There is often thought
without images; images play a secondary role (they are "by-products")
in the thinking process; they occur to the extent that there is doubt in
the thinking; thought and imagery function independently; and, "the
logic of thought is entirely distinct from imagery."
Actually, the two types of knowledge are so extremely different that it
may be impossible to conceive of some mechanical model by which one
could be converted into the other. The would-be input (perceptions) and
output (knowledge) are two entirely different, though coexisting, orders of
knowledge. In this sense Chomsky's discrepancy is understandable. But
his solution is not: Positing more innateness instead of less of it does not
relate these two realms of knowledge, and, to repeat a point, still leaves
the black box a passive mechanism, ignoring the active creativity evident
26)
in knowledge acquisition. (Or are we to suppose that the genious is
simply better wired up when he interprets some aspect of the world in a
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new way? Has he simply been carrying on data-processing in some way
predetermined by his black box?)
Jolivet's more personal and dynamic view of interpretation of percep-
tions unites knowledge of specific entities (through images, for example)
with knowledge of their essential features (through concepts). Extended
to language acquisition, we have here a formalized hypothesis which
accomodates two very different linguistic entities: specific linguistic data
to which an individual is exposed (and of which much is recorded in his
memory as such), and the resulting (more abstract) competence which
he acquires-in a way which relates them but does not equate them.
Notes
1) Cf. Chomsky (1965, p. 51) for remarks on this issue.
2) Various references can be found in Derwing (1973, p. 63f, for example).
3) Some of the questions in this issue are sketched in Braine (1971, p. 18f) ; see
also Lenneberg (1964).
4) Cf. Derwing (1973, p. 52).
5) Ibid., p. 77.
6) See Sutherland (1966, p. 158) who extends the parallel with a computer in a
distinction between competence and "mechanism," going on to distinguish two
senses of "mechanism" : the make-up of the machine and the input to which it
is subjected. But see Miller (1962, p. 55), too, who assures Americans that mind
is no longer a four-letter word, going back to the idea that this is precisely the
object of psychological study.
7) On the inadequacy of "models" in representing language, see comments by
McDavid (1966, p. 115f).
8) Chomsky's close parallel between a linguistic theory and linguistic innateness
in a child (see Aspects, p. 30, ff) also reduces the personal element in language
acquisition by minimizing the individual's role and relegating a large part of
learning to the human species as such.
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9) Rf. Katz (1966, p. 278, n. 28).
10) Cassirer refers to cognition as creation, not imitation ; see Hormann (1971, p.
301).
ll) The Aristotelian view that the link between language and the world is man-
made already implies a human creativity ; cf. Hormann (1971, p. 149).
12) Nagel, on the contrary, maintains that even induction requires a "creative
imagination ;" noted in Derwing (1973, p. 57).
13) Rf. Householder (1971), p. 4 ; emphasis added).
14) Noted in Derwing (1973, p. 64 ; emphasis added).
15) This insight leads to a blending of what we divide as art and science. Creativity
in the arts is evident ; but an artistic act is originated from within the artist
and, for him, amounts to a new interpretation (a revised knowledge) of reality.
It is a process of active, personal, creative, and free thought, far removed from
an automatic reflex in a passive, impersonal and externally-determined apparatus.
Within the individual, then, are inseparably and intimately related science and
art, knowing and interpreting, and in language use, construction of sentences in
speaking and reconstruction in hearing. What is apparently a productive/recep-
tive dichotomy here is not an active/passive one ; all are active, creative, free
and emminently personal.
16) Cf. Jolivet (1941, 13-16).
17) See Osgood's (1952, p. 149f) criticism of early behaviorism as naively Pavlovian.
18) References found in Jolivet have not been repeated here.
19) From Jolivet (1941, p. 422; the wording of the paradox is almost verbatim) ;
see also Gilson, Etienne, The Unity of Philosophical Experience. New York.
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937 (pp. 3ff).
20) Cf. Jolivet (1941, 440 and 445).
21) Cf. Ibid., 446.
22) Cf. Ibid., 10.
23) Cf. Ibid., 18-19.
24) Cf. Ibid., 49f.
25) Cf. Ibid., 430.
26) Cf. Ibid., 417-19.
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